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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks can be used by the mil-
itary for a number of purposes such as monitoring militant
activity in remote areas and force protection. Being equipped
with appropriate sensors these networks can enable detection
of enemy movement, identification of enemy force and analy-
sis of their movement and progress. The focus of this article
is on the military requirements for flexible wireless sensor
networks. Based on the main networking characteristics and
military use-cases, insight into specific military requirements
is given in order to facilitate the reader’s understanding of
the operation of these networks in the near to medium term
(within the next three to eight years). The article structures
the evolution of military sensor networking devices by identi-
fying three generations of sensors along with their capabilities.
Existing developer solutions are presented and an overview of
some existing tailored products for the military environment
is given. The article concludes with an analysis of outstanding
engineering and scientific challenges in order to achieve fully
flexible, security proved, ad hoc, self-organizing and scalable
military sensor networks.
Keywords— wireless sensor networks, military sensor applica-
tions, joint intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (JISR), mil-
itary sensors, energy efficient routing, WSN generations.
1. Introduction
There have been large amounts of research undertaken dur-
ing the past decade in the areas of ad hoc networking and
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and significant progress
has been achieved. Possible civilian use-cases for such
networks include industrial plant monitoring and environ-
mental monitoring. However, one area commonly cited as
a primary use of sensor networks is for military benefit.
Frequently, assumptions are stated regarding the require-
ments for military networks to motivate the work. The aim
of this paper is to explore the military requirements of wire-
less sensor networks in the near to medium term (three to
eight years) and to identify areas of research which would
improve military usability.
2. The main characteristics of a sensor
network
Wireless ad hoc sensor networks generally consist of a vari-
able number of stationary sensors (also known as nodes)
spread across a geographical area. The capabilities of
these nodes typically comprise monitoring the environ-
ment and capturing specific information; the transmission
of collected (and possibly preprocessed) data; as well as
the forwarding of data obtained from neighbor nodes us-
ing wireless bearers1. A typical network structure is shown
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Network set-up of a typical wireless ad hoc sensor net-
work.
The information flow in a wireless sensor network will in
general be from the sensor nodes to one or more wireless
sensor network gateways. The network gateways can serve
as data fusion points and provide reach-back capability. The
reach-back capability can be based on different approaches
such as:
– near real time connection, e.g., via longer range wire-
less transmissions (high frequency) or via a satellite
link;
– asynchronous data transfer to passing unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Data processing can generally occur in three areas of the
sensor network as shown in Fig. 2.
Processing can be carried out on the sensor node itself (such
as the removal of unwanted signals from a target signal).
Processing at the node reduces the amount of data to be
passed over the network. This ensures that data loadings
can be kept within the capacity capabilities of the radio
system. In general, power consumption for the transmission
of data is greater than the power consumption required to
1It is worth noting that by appropriately equipping sensor nodes with ac-
tive capabilities, the network can operate actively as well as passively. The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Wolfpack concept
of small, low-cost distributed jammers exemplifies an active network [1].
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Fig. 2. Processing within a sensor network.
perform the same amount of processing data, thus there are
power efficiency benefits in processing the data at source.
Data processing can also be used to alleviate the amount of
processing to be carried out at any gateways in the system.
However, some data processing depends on data coming
from multiple sources and therefore processing at source is
not always possible.
Data processing can also be distributed within the network.
This can be especially useful in large networks as it not
only alleviates the amount of processing at the gateway but
dramatically reduces the data loading which sensor nodes
have to relay across the network. Hierarchical topologies
lend themselves easily to perform distributed processing at
“head” or “cluster” nodes (i.e., those nodes which logically
“manage” other nodes in the hierarchy). However, there is
an overhead associated with distributed processing. Either
extra routing overhead is required to be able to pass data
to be processed to specified nodes, or flooding techniques
must be employed. Flooding techniques will forward user
data to all or a limited subgroup of nodes thus negating the
need for routing overhead traffic. These techniques allow
unprocessed data to be exchanged between nodes adjacent
to an “event” so that they can each do the processing re-
quired to locate the event. Then only the processed infor-
mation is passed back to the gateway.
Finally, data can be processed at the gateway node(s). This
allows the gateway to minimize the data it will send over
the reach-back channel. Processing at the gateway thus will
enable less power to be consumed in reach-back transmis-
sions thus increasing the gateway’s longevity and subse-
quently the lifetime of the whole network (as the gateway
node is frequently the first node to fail due to depletion of
its power source).
3. Military requirements
One of the main drivers for investigating wireless sensor
networks is their use in military applications. The military
use-cases for wireless sensor networks are diverse. They
encompass applications such as:
– monitoring militant activity in remote areas of spe-
cific interest (e.g., key roads, villages);
– force protection (e.g., ensuring that buildings which
have been cleared remain clear from infiltration by
an adversary).
One prominent use-case which has received a great deal
of interest from military personnel recently is base protec-
tion (or force protection in general). A possible set-up is
depicted in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Wireless sensors in support of base protection (e.g., mak-
ing use of acoustic as well as electro-optical sensors).
Having deployed a headquarters in an area of active en-
gagement it is essential to prevent the base from being
attacked. The surrounding terrain may be undulating or
mountainous and potentially could be obscured in trees
and vegetation. Attack could come in the form of militant
groups on foot or with motor vehicles.
In order to facilitate an early detection, the perimeter pro-
tection in Fig. 3 would cover a belt around the camp of up
to 4 km, while in practice ranges of up to 10 km might
be a requirement. Detection may be needed throughout
the whole of this range whilst identification may only be
required within a belt of around one to 1–2 km around
the base.
3.1. Typical assumptions in the research community
Military applications are a primary use of wireless sen-
sor networking and are best served by informed research
that avoids making assumptions that are based on presumed
military requirements. Many research papers propose algo-
rithms for network sizes of thousands of sensor nodes and
above. It is assumed that sensor nodes will be extremely
small, lightweight and cheap. These are combined with
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the need for long battery lifetime. These assumptions have
led to the following requirements:
– tailored routing and transport protocols are needed;
– short distances between nodes (often just a few me-
tres) are taken for granted;
– special-purpose operating systems are required.
In practice these assumptions are more challenging than
required in the near-term for current military needs while
other aspects such as tamper-resistance are not sufficiently
addressed. The following section gives an insight into cur-
rent requirements for sensor networks in the military envi-
ronment.
3.2. Realistic assumptions for military usage
In order to facilitate a meaningful operation of wireless
sensor networks for military purposes in the near to medium
term, there are a number of requirements which the military
expect to be met.
Physical attributes of sensors. It is likely that the sen-
sor nodes themselves could be hand deployed in advance
of an operation. They could be transported to the area of
deployment by vehicle. Thus the physical size and weight
of the sensor need not be a major constraint. Sensor nodes
the size of a matchbox, although desirable, are not cur-
rently expected and a sensor node (without including an-
tenna) of order 20–30 cm in height would be acceptable.
In occasional instances sensor nodes may be air dropped or
deployed through a rocket launcher and would need to be
suitably ruggedized.
Self-configuration after deployment. Sensor nodes must
be able to rapidly identify neighbours within communica-
tions range and configure themselves into an ad hoc net-
work. The network is likely to remain reasonably static as
sensor nodes are unlikely to be moved during operation.
The network should be able to cope with a node failing
and reconfiguration of the network should occur without
manual intervention.
Network size. For the majority of operations the area to be
covered by the network may be between 5–20 km2. Gen-
erally a communications range between nodes of around
250–500 m would be acceptable. This would amount to
networks with less than 100 nodes being required. In oc-
casional cases communication ranges of greater than 1 km
would be desirable.
Information flows. Initially one-way communications can
be seen as sufficient, i.e., from the sensor network to the
WSN gateway and beyond. This is sufficient to achieve im-
proved situational awareness for the warfighter as well as
for the commander. In the medium term some degree of
control within the network will be beneficial, e.g., the abil-
ity to orient cameras. This would however necessitate the
need for communications in both directions. This need for
two way communications should be reflected in the network
security concept in order to avoid information leakage be-
tween a stub sensor network and the core military network
to which it is attached.
Duration of usage. Some networks are only required to
operate for periods of days, although generally periods of
one to two months can be seen as a reasonable for military
sensor networks. In the base protection example (Fig. 3)
an exchange of batteries is practical and could extend the
lifetime further. In some instances the network may not
require to be functional throughout the whole day (perhaps
only needed at night) or transmission of data from the WSN
gateways may only be needed two or three times a day.
Physically and electronically inconspicuous operation. It
would be beneficial if the nodes were covert in appearance
with a small electromagnetic emission pattern so as to re-
main hidden from potential adversaries.
Data type. Even limited amounts of text (< 30 bytes) can
help to ensure information superiority by identifying an
incident and providing location reports. This means data
transmission rates do not need to be high. However, mil-
itary commanders are likely to request imagery and video
(both real-time and non-real time) in the future.
Data reliability. In many cases it is vital to ensure that
data has been received by the end-user successfully, and
techniques to guarantee delivery should be included. Also
data should be received in a secure manner without the
opportunity for interception and tampering by any eaves-
dropper.
Denial of service. Any network should be able to react
against a denial of service attack by an adversary, at least
by providing the means to report the incident of an attack
such as jamming.
Tamper-proof. The data held on the node along with any
crypto material must not be available to any third party even
if the node itself is captured. The sensor nodes should have
anti-tamper mechanisms in-built to address this.
Costs. As relevant information can be gained by the use of
networks with just a few tens of sensors, and the retrieval
of sensors after use might be desirable (e.g., for security
reasons), the price for a single node is generally not as
critical as in the “civil Bluetooth-focussed market”.
4. Current technologies
4.1. Generations of sensor products
In a similar fashion to the evolution of mobile cellular tech-
nologies, it is possible to describe the evolution of military
sensor devices in terms of generations.
First generation sensor networks (1GSN). Sensor net-
works consist of individual sensor devices. Deployment is
via manual emplacement. The network is fully preconfig-
ured. Access to information is via manual retrieval of the
device itself, or long-range point-to-point communication
links.
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Second generation sensor networks (2GSN). Sensors
work in collaboration to cover an area. The network is typ-
ically a hub and spoke formation with a small number of
sensors (typically 3 or 4) communicating with a control
node equipped with a reach-back link. They are typically
manually deployed, relying heavily on preconfiguration.
Third generation sensor networks (3GSN). The latest
generation of sensors encompasses self-organising, flexible
and scalable networks. Sensors communicate with one an-
other for two purposes, communications services (e.g., au-
tomatic relaying of messages to a network gateway) and
in-network processing (data aggregation and data fusion).
Sensor networks can contain many tens or even hundreds
of nodes. Deployment can be hand-emplaced or remotely
air-dropped. The sensors are able to establish and – if re-
quired – publish and make use of their own geographic
location, e.g., based on global positioning system (GPS).
4.2. Fully integrated solutions
Companies such as SenTech, Textron and Lockheed Mar-
tin have systems with a variety of sensors (including seis-
mic, acoustic, infrared) which transfer their data directly
to a ground station over a number of long-range non-line
of sight bearers (including satcom, very high frequency
and high frequency bearers). These generally fit into the
1GSN category of networks where each node is equipped
with its own backhaul system.
There is a number of 2GSN systems becoming available
such as the Terrain Commander and Future Combat Sys-
tem from Textron Systems, or the Falcon Watch System
from Harris which will provide processed information from
a number of sensors (including acoustic, seismic, magnetic,
electro-optical and passive infrared). However, in general,
there are very few of the 2GSN systems on the market. Nei-
ther, the 1GSN or 2GSN systems are truly ad hoc multi-hop
in nature requiring either a direct link back to a remote
ground station or a direct link back to a gateway node.
There are a few 3GSN ad hoc systems advertised although
many of these appear to be immature and still at proof-of-
concept stage.
The majority of the systems are aimed at military use (as
well as industrial plant monitoring) and many of them cite
perimeter protection as their main function (for both mili-
tary assets and civilian assets such as airstrips).
4.3. Wireless sensor network components
Flexible ad hoc sensor networking needs to be supported by
tailored network components such as the sensors themselves
and special-purpose routing protocols. Significant scientific
and engineering effort has been spent on some of these
components which is reflected in the following.
Routing protocols should enable self-configuration after
network deployment. They have influence on traffic latency
(as some routing protocols will find routes at set-up whilst
others require a route to be found prior to each transmis-
sion of user traffic), on networking overhead, on energy
efficiency, on the speed of network recovery in case of
failures, on traffic assurance. Three main classes of routing
protocols for energy-efficient wireless sensor networks have
been identified [2–4]:
• Hierarchical/node-centric. Most routing protocols
follow this approach. These protocols aim at clus-
tering the nodes so that “cluster heads” can perform
some aggregation. This reduces the amount of data
to be transmitted and saves energy. The scalability
of these protocols is very good. However, their rout-
ing tables may take time to converge (i.e., choose the
most appropriate route) if frequent network topology
changes occur (which can happen if nodes can tran-
sition into suspend mode to conserve energy).
• Location based/position-centric. This routing class
is based on the exact (GPS) or relative (triangulation,
analysis of neighbor dependencies) position of the
single nodes. The distance between sensor nodes can
be used to estimate the required transmission power
which facilitates energy efficient routing.
• Data-centric. In the data-centric approach the sensor
network is seen from the application point of view
as a pool of data. The interface to the network will
forward a query and the network will return the data
to satisfy the query condition. The routing is driven
by the query of the application, not on the identity
of the involved nodes or sensors. The underlying im-
plementation of the routing protocol might still be
hierarchical/node-centric, and it may only be the in-
terface available to the user that is data-centric.
Other classification of routing protocols for wireless sensor
networks can characterize the network by their ability to
make use of multipath transmissions, to aggregate data and
to eliminate redundant information:
• Multipath. The main reason for transmissions via
several paths is to provide tolerance to faults in the
network. The protocols address the fact that they
take advantage of more than one route to the gateway.
Mechanisms must be integrated to ensure that only
limited (or ideally no) redundant information will be
produced.
• Data processing. Data processing can be performed
at different places in the network as discussed in the
context of Fig. 2. Intelligent data aggregation allows
the network to operate in an energy efficient manner
as less data needs to flow over the network.
• Negotiation based. High level data descriptors can
be used to eliminate redundant information through
negotiation. The nodes will send negotiation mes-
sages to prevent or suppress the exchange of dupli-
cated or unwanted information. It is important to en-
sure that the level of negotiation overhead is limited.
A selection of routing protocols for wireless sensor net-
works which are subdivided into classes and associated
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Table 1
Routing protocols with associated characteristics
Routing protocol Node-centric
Position-
Data-centric Multipath
Data Negotiation
centric processing based
LEACH [5] X X X
PEGASIS [6] X X
Tiny-AODV [7] X X
MECN [8] X
Geographic adaptive fidelity [9] X X
GEAR [10] X
SPIN [11] X X X X
Directed diffusion [12] X X X X
Rumor routing [13] X X
Gradient-based routing [14] X X
COUGAR [15] X X
with the above-mentioned characteristics is shown in Ta-
ble 1. The presented protocols are just a sample of the
protocols discussed in literature. The usage of these proto-
cols in available products is however still rare and generally
non-specialized protocols such as optimized link state rout-
ing (OSLR) are used as these protocols are more mature.
In the future, disruption tolerant networking (DTN) tech-
niques [16, 17] may receive further attention. These help
to provide end-to-end communications in networks with
large delays and/or frequent interruptions. Also the connec-
tion of the sensor network through the network gateways to
the end application might profit from this approach – espe-
cially if this reach-back capability is not always present as
in the case of the UAV relay.
Medium access control (MAC). The medium access con-
trol scheme defines how multiple radios will access the
medium and is used to avoid collisions should two or more
radios wish to transmit simultaneously. The MAC scheme
has an influence on the efficiency of a distributed sen-
sor network in three ways: throughput, delay and energy.
Throughput can suffer due to collisions when two or more
nodes transmit information at the same time. This wastes
energy as well as introducing longer periods of idle listen-
ing. Within the range of specialized MAC protocols for
wireless sensor networks, two generic types can be identi-
fied [18]:
• Scheduled protocols. These are time division mul-
tiple access (TDMA) based protocols mostly used
in combination with hierarchical/node centric rout-
ing protocols as cluster heads are needed for syn-
chronization purposes.
• Contention protocols. Carrier sense multiple access
(CSMA) is an important part of the contention based
protocols. Modifications of the MAC scheme of
the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
(IEEE) 802.11 family addressing frequency changes
as well as protocol optimizations can be found.
Within existing wireless sensor products and developer
kits the use of “Commercial off the Shelf” (COTS) proto-
cols stemming from wireless local area network (WLAN),
Bluetooth or Zigbee are common, and mature implementa-
tions of specialized MAC protocols are rare.
Transmission technologies. Based on an analysis of mil-
itary use-cases it becomes apparent that low data rates of
just a few kilobits per second can often be sufficient while
transmission ranges of a few tens of metres or better a few
hundreds of metres are desirable. Sufficient coverage can
then be achieved based on multi-hopping (allowing inter-
mediate nodes to relay data). This hopping concept has
the additional positive effect, that the output power can be
reduced facilitating a low probability of detection and in-
terception.
In case of other signals being transmitted within the same
frequency band – be it due to other users or to jam-
ming – the transmission technology should provide some
robustness against narrowband interference. Combined
with the desire to achieve inconspicuous operation, the
following transmission technologies can subsequently be
seen as prominent for use in military wireless sensor net-
works:
– direct sequence spread spectrum (DS-SS),
– frequency hopping spread spectrum (FH-SS),
– pulsed ultra-wideband (UWB).
In many prototype networks, COTS chipsets are being used
providing transmission based on:
– Bluetooth (FH-SS),
– ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4/WPAN, DS-SS) or
– WLAN (IEEE 802.11b using DS-SS as well).
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Table 2
Developer platforms and their operating systems (updated and expanded from [22])
RAM
Program Nonvolatile
Tiny OS Mantis
Platform MCU
[KB]
memory data memory Radio chip Tiny OS
V2 OS
SOS
[KB] [KB]
BTnode3 ATMega128 64 128 180 CC1000
X X
ZV4002 Bluet.
Cricket ATMega128 4 128 512 CC1000 X
imote ARM 7 64 512 0 ZV4002 Bluet. X
imote2 Intel PXA271 256 32 ·108 0 CC2420 X X
MANTIS nymph ATMega 128 4 128 64 CC1000 X
mica ATMega 128 4 128 512 TR1000 X
mica2 ATMega 128 4 128 512 CC1000 X X X X
mica2Dot ATMega 128 4 128 512 CC1000 X X X
micaz ATMega 128 4 128 512 CC2420 X X X X
rene2 ATMega 163 1 8 32 TR1000 X
TelosA TI MSP430 2 60 512 CC2420 X
TelosB TI MSP430 10 48 1000 CC2420 X X X
Tmote Sky TI MSP430 10 48 1000 CC2420 X
tinynode TI MSP430 10 48 512 XE1205 X X
XYZ ARM 7 32 256 256 CC2420 X
However, while remaining within the legal power limits for
the respective frequency bands, the transmission ranges are
not generally sufficient with WLAN achieving only dis-
tances of around 200 metres in practice2.
Sensor types. A wide range of different sensor types which
are usable for wireless sensor applications are available on
the market:
– acoustic sensors,
– seismic sensors,
– magnetic sensors,
– infrared sensors,
– electro-optical sensors (closed circuit TV, etc.),
– electromagnetic sensors.
Significant effort is necessary for proper integration into
larger-scale sensor networks, and one of the greatest chal-
lenges is improving sensor accuracy to keep the false
alarm rate to a minimum. The need for a reliable detec-
tion of critical incidents has led to the use of multi-modal
sensors. The intelligent combination of sensors and their
joint accuracy are essential for future robust sensor ap-
2Dependent on terrain and other environmental factors and with an
omni-directional antenna.
plications. Furthermore, multi-modal sensors can minimize
the power consumption as well as the generated traffic,
e.g., if a video camera is enabled by an acoustic sensor
or an infrared sensor.
Security. There are a number of security solutions to the
issues inherent in a wireless sensor network. A wireless
sensor network is like any other data exchange network with
generic vulnerabilities and associated solutions including:
• Eavesdropping. The potential for an enemy to in-
tercept and decode messages passed between devices
in the sensor network. Protection is possible using
available civil crypto to prevent successful eavesdrop-
ping in a sensor network, particularly as the informa-
tion is generally of only short-term utility.
• Spoofing. The potential for a (non-legitimate) node
to pass itself off as a legitimate network node and
thereby subvert network exchanges. Current cryp-
tographic authentication mechanisms are available
which would be appropriate for wireless sensor net-
works.
• Message integrity. The ability of messages to be
passed between nodes unchanged or unmodified en-
route. Cryptographic protection and strong integrity
checks (e.g., secure hash) are available now and pro-
vide robust protection against message tampering and
replay attacks.
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• Denial of service. Preventing nodes in the network
from being able to access and use the radio network
to pass messages. Low-cost transceivers currently do
not have robust anti-jam capabilities making sensor
networks susceptible to this type of attack.
• Geolocation. The ability to locate the geographical
position of nodes in the sensor network by detecting
and receiving emissions from the devices. Reduc-
ing transmissions to an absolute minimum both in
duration and number reduces the chance that an ad-
versary will detect or locate a sensor network. This
optimization can be included in the protocol choice
and design. However, there will always be the danger
that an adversary will detect transmissions, particu-
larly if they suspect that an area contains a sensor
network.
• Physical compromise. The ability of an enemy to
extract useful intelligence and information out of
a sensor node that has been located and captured.
It is likely physical compromise can be addressed
through simple anti-tamper mechanisms, e.g., micro-
switches, and fill-purge mechanisms to purge system
memory of sensitive data. These are tried and tested
approaches to physical resilience.
4.4. Developer kits
A number of developer solutions (“developer kits”) which
include sensor platforms, operating systems and transmis-
sion technologies are currently available. These are useful
for research purposes as well as to foster the development of
versatile sensor network applications. Table 2 shows a sum-
marized overview of existing platforms including some of
their technical parameters.
5. Research opportunities
5.1. Engineering challenges
Current wireless sensor networks can make use of multi-
ple years of research on ad hoc networking, energy-efficient
routing and related areas. Consequently, the use-cases illus-
trated in this paper can be met to a greater or lesser extent
by existing technologies. The key challenges to deploying
military wireless sensor networks are more practical engi-
neering problems than fundamental research issues as listed
below:
– clear identification of several simultaneous events,
and a reliable correlation of information from neigh-
boring nodes;
– classification of objects and events in addition to their
pure detection; an automatic identification and classi-
fication of objects and events would support a quick
and appropriate reaction and would hence improve
the use for military purposes;
– improved integration of different types of sensors
(multi-modal sensors) for enhanced information re-
liability; as many events have a number of simul-
taneous effects such as creating not only noise but
also emitting electromagnetic waves, combining sen-
sors for a “joint detection” is expected to significantly
improve the reliability especially in challenging en-
vironments;
– radio communications for use of wireless sensors
in, specifically, urban warfare provides further chal-
lenges such as overcoming possibly strong interfer-
ence from many sources, shadowing from buildings
coupled with severe multipath transmission and at the
same time achieving sufficient coverage and energy-
efficiency with inconspicuous small-scale antennas
and electromagnetic patterns;
– miniaturization of sensors allowing for a quick and
automated network deployment and unsuspicious op-
eration;
– robustness of sensors for deployment from planes or
by rocket-launches;
– avoidance of data loops in large sensor networks;
– appropriate anti-tamper mechanisms;
– the optimization of sensor networks to provide the
most efficient coverage of a geographic area; a num-
ber of trade-offs need to be considered including cost
(minimizing the cost per unit area of coverage), com-
munications range, sensor range, device size, weight,
power, capability (e.g., detect and classify or just de-
tect), and deployment mechanisms;
– agree on common formats and standards for sensor
data and communications exchange.
5.2. Scientific challenges
Capabilities required for 3GSN sensor networks are far-
reaching, and the step from existing 2GSN to future 3GSN
truly ad hoc systems is huge. Research has still to address
a number of challenges in order to increase the usability,
flexibility and security, as well as to facilitate longer-term
operations. These challenges include:
– security, particularly regarding the effectiveness of
reputation approaches to protect against the injection
of spoof messages or jamming;
– suitable power supplies and energy efficient proto-
cols to meet the long-endurance applications where
networks may be in place for several months; this
includes power scavenging (e.g., EU IST VIBES
project [19, 20]) and novel power sources [21];
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– effective and efficient remote air delivery of sensors
ensuring even density and coverage across area;
– robustness of data fusion and analysis, ensuring that
data from multiple sensors can be appropriately pro-
cessed to accurately detect and track moving objects
even in the presence of measurement inaccuracies,
distortions and communications delays.
6. Conclusions
Wireless sensor networks will have a role to play for a num-
ber of military purposes such as enemy movement detection
and force tracking.
Comparing the actual military requirements with the cur-
rent research and the available products, some misalign-
ments become obvious. Much effort in current academic
research is spent on optimization, e.g., routing protocols to
work with tens of thousands of nodes, which are assumed to
be small, lightweight and cheap. The paper has addressed
the military requirements for actual costs per node, the cur-
rent mode of deployment (mainly manual network set-up)
and physical size. The limited existing products tend to
address the current military requirements in that they are
composed of larger sensor devices and consist only of small
numbers of nodes (often even < 30 nodes).
The key challenges to deploying military wireless sensor
networks are more practical engineering problems than fun-
damental research issues. However there are still outstand-
ing scientific challenges as stated in this paper. Urban
warfare scenarios are especially demanding and efforts such
as the optimization of multi-modal sensors need to be ad-
dressed.
The use of common formats for sensor data such as tex-
tual information or images facilitates information exchange
across network boundaries and promotes openness between
sensor network vendors. This allows those requiring kit to
purchase from multiple suppliers and keeps a competitive
market place open (i.e., no one supplier can monopolize
the supply base). The use of appropriate NATO STANAGs
(standardization agreements) is encouraged.
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